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D I A L O G U E
Green Finance: Leveraging 
Investment for Environmental 
Protection
Summary
Some political narratives describe the relationship between 
environmental protection and economic growth as two 
inherently incompatible goals. As the global community 
turns its attention to implementing international climate 
agreements, this story is ceding ground to the realization 
that the economy must facilitate a transition to sustain-
ability. With limited government funding available, private 
investments offer an opportunity to dramatically increase 
and leverage funding to address daunting environmental 
problems. Green financing will play a critical role in the 
shift to a green economy.
Governments, intergovernmental organizations, 
financial institutions, corporations, and nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) are examining green financ-
ing mechanisms in earnest. Financial institutions are 
enabling investment in green infrastructure, and many 
have signed on to the Equator Principles, a risk manage-
ment framework for determining, assessing, and manag-
ing environmental and social risk in projects. NGOs and 
governments are promoting public policies that encour-
age investments in sustainability, and developing public 
and private mechanisms to facilitate investments in envi-
ronmentally beneficial projects, such as the Paris Climate 
Agreement's Green Climate Fund. With targets including 
pollution control, biodiversity protection, and materials 
management, as well as investments directly related to 
decreasing reliance on fossil fuels, the impacts of green 
financing could reshape the landscape for environmental 
professions. On June 6, 2017, ELI held a public seminar to 
present recent developments in this field. Below we pres-
ent a transcript of the discussion, which has been edited 
for style, clarity, and space considerations.
Michael Gerrard (moderator) is Director of the Sabin 
Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School.
Charles E. Di Leva is a Visiting Scholar at the Environmental 
Law Institute.
John Rousakis is Counsel for O’Melveny & Myers LLP.
Douglass Sims is Director of Strategy & Finance at the 
Natural Resources Defense Council’s Center for Market 
Innovation.
Michael Gerrard: As is going to become abundantly clear, 
there is no one standard definition of “green finance” in 
terms of what’s included or not. So, I’m going to talk about 
finance that is directly related to climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. In particular, what is it that will ultimately 
need to be paid for?
And so, of course, we start with mitigation and green-
house gas emissions reductions—which is mostly migrat-
ing away from fossil fuels. That involves efforts to minimize 
energy use through a number of energy-efficiency mea-
sures, and efforts to decarbonize the electric power supply 
to move from fossil fuels toward clean sources of elec-
tricity like wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, and possibly 
nuclear—although that’s a different debate. It also involves 
electrifying the vehicle fleet and converting space heating, 
space cooling, and water heating away from fossil fuels to 
electricity. All of that means that we essentially need to 
eventually double the supply of electricity, and all of the 
electricity needs to come from clean sources. Doing that 
will be enormously expensive. That is one of the important 
elements of green finance, paying for this massive decar-
bonization effort.
We also know that even if we were making our best 
efforts, there would be a lot of climate change happening. 
Therefore, a lot of adaptation would be needed. That’s cop-
ing with the unstoppable climate change that will occur. 
An enormous number of activities will be needed to pro-
tect properties that are vulnerable to coastal hazards and 
to other climate-related problems, for example by putting 
buildings on stilts or retreating from the coastline or a vari-
ety of other methods that are needed for adaptation. In 
many parts of the country, the water supply system will 
need to be reconfigured. Many agricultural systems are 
going to need to be changed. Lots of other things are going 
to have to be done as well.
Not included in any of these are losses that will occur 
as a result of property destruction and lost productivity 
from climate change. But this is not monetized. It’s not 
subject to green finance because really nobody pays for it, 
except sometimes insurance companies. Otherwise, these 
are just economic losses. In the ideal world, we, the devel-
oped world, would also be helping the developing coun-
tries cope with the losses that they will inevitably suffer as 
a result of climate change due largely to our greenhouse gas 
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emissions. And then there’s the issue of what to do with the 
unspeakably large number of people who will ultimately 
be displaced.
None of this is conventionally thought of as a subject 
of green finance. But these are, in fact, costs that will be 
incurred by society. We know that the Paris Agreement 
essentially called for a complete transition away from fossil 
fuels. President Donald Trump is backing away from Paris, 
but the rest of the world is staying there. Hopefully, one 
day, the United States will return to the overall agreement 
and to this idea.
How much will all of this cost? There’s no consensus 
on this. But a couple of figures will give you a sense of the 
number of zeroes involved. An important 2015 report by 
the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project1 indicated a 
whole range of costs for the United States. But the central 
estimate of the cost for the United States would be in 2050, 
$320 billion, and ramping up to be in the hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars each year for the next several decades—all 
for this massive project to decarbonize the energy system.
Prof. Geoffrey Heal at Columbia Business School is 
using a set of different assumptions and definitions.2 He 
had a somewhat lower estimate. But overall, we’re talking 
about hundreds of billions of dollars per year. This does not 
count fossil fuel cost savings. The more we move away from 
fossil fuels, then the less we’ll have to spend on fossil fuels, 
obviously. So, that is a massive offset that is not included 
in these numbers.
Bloomberg New Energy Finance has come up with some 
global estimates.3 For each five-year period, they com-
pare what would be needed under a continuation of the 
business-as-usual scenario. Even under a business-as-usual 
scenario, you have a lot of clean energy, a lot of wind and 
solar being built. But then if we ramp up to a two-degree 
pathway, we see higher numbers. So, for these five-year 
increments going out to 2040, for each one, we have up 
to $4.4 trillion over the course of five years. Thus, there’s 
a lot of money that is going to be necessary. Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance has also estimated what portion of 
these expenditures will be used for what (e.g., solar, wind, 
biomass, and geothermal).
In terms of adaptation, again, this is not generally con-
sidered part of green finance, but it will have real costs. 
There are no good estimates for what these costs will be. 
But it’s likely in the high tens or hundreds of billions of 
dollars per year, just for the United States for adaptation 
to climate change. In terms of global adaptation cost, the 
United Nations Environment Programme each year issues 
an adaptation finance gap report,4 which includes estimates 
1. Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, Pathways to Deep Decar-
bonization (2015), available at http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/03/DDPP_2015_REPORT.pdf.
2. Geoffrey Heal, What Would It Take to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions 80% by 2050?, Working Paper 22525, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Aug. 2016, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22525.pdf.
3. Bloomberg New Energy Finance, New Energy Outlook 2017, https://
about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/#toc-download.
4. United Nations Environment Programme, , 
http://web.unep.org/adaptationgapreport/content/adaptation-gap-reports 
for the annual costs for adaptation in the developing world. 
This is just for the developing world, not the developed 
world, so this is on top of the cost that would be incurred 
by the United States and Canada and Europe and so forth. 
The ranges, again, are in the hundreds of billions of dollars 
per year out to 2050. In 2050, it doesn’t stop. It keeps get-
ting worse—and how much worse depends on the success 
we have in controlling temperatures.
In terms of what the actual economic costs would be, 
an important study headed by Tom Steyer and Michael 
Bloomberg and others had some very, very high estimates 
of what the economic cost would be just in the United 
States in the years to come as a result of climate change.5 
All of this adds up to an enormous financial burden that 
we’ll have to figure out how to pay for.
Joining us first is Charles Di Leva, a visiting scholar with 
the Environmental Law Institute. He retired as chief coun-
sel for the Environmental and International Law Practice 
Group at the World Bank, where he advised on operational 
and policy matters related to sustainable development and 
climate change and its related roles and responsibilities. 
He’s also an adjunct professor at both American University 
Washington College of Law and George Washington Uni-
versity Law School.
Charles Di Leva: Following on what Professor Gerrard has 
laid out as the scope and scale of the challenge, I will talk 
about some ways we might be able to help deal with this 
massive financial challenge by promoting green finance.
As Mike mentioned, there are different definitions and, 
depending on where you’re acting, you may be using differ-
ent sources of funding for dealing with climate or dealing 
with issues of gender support or indigenous communities 
or other kinds of biodiversity-related issues. There is some-
times an importance to the nuance in terms of the termi-
nology we’re using.
I want to talk about various incentives that help make 
finance green: rules, regulations, and guidance. They don’t 
really fall into hard-and-fast binding and nonbinding cat-
egories. Depending on how you look at what I’ll describe, 
there may be something that we’d look at as typically bind-
ing legislation, or there may be various incentives that can 
be what we’d call soft or guidance terminology. I’ll look at 
some of the risks that can help promote green finance, and 
then some of the reputational issues as well.
On the harder binding requirements that incentivize 
green finance, I think, despite the U.S. pullout, we can 
look at the example of the Paris Agreement. Even though 
it’s been in the news that the United States’ nationally 
determined contribution (NDC) was not legally binding, 
when one looks at the 160+ NDCs that were submitted 
by the Paris Agreement, it’s true in the context of Paris 
that governments can change. But beneath that is the fact 
that within many of those NDCs there already are binding 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
5. The Bottom Line on Climate Change, Risky Business, https://riskybusiness.
org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
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commitments that will drive green finance. Mexico had 
already adopted a climate change law. China has put in 
place emission trading systems. Look at what California 
has done. Also, carbon pricing schemes, something that 
the World Bank has been working very hard to promote, 
are witnessed in the legally binding price regimes that you 
see, for example, in some of the major Canadian prov-
inces—Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario.
Then, when it comes to large international financial 
institutions, the multilateral institutions such as the World 
Bank and other development banks like the new Asia Infra-
structure Investment Bank, their criteria require impact 
assessments to look at greenhouse gas emissions and to try 
to reduce the emissions to the extent feasible.
In addition, there are other reporting requirements that 
are binding. There’s a European Union (EU) directive on 
nonfinancial reporting that captures climate-related risks 
and programs of what are called “large companies” in the 
EU scheme—those that have more than 500 employees.6 
It’s interesting to see that the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges are also requiring climate reporting. We 
still have Regulation S-K in the United States for envi-
ronmental disclosure, which is a requisite under the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission.7 It’s interesting to 
look at some of the new trade agreements and how they 
are specifically trying to protect climate regulation against 
claims by investors that new climate regulation could be 
seen as direct or indirect expropriation. All of these things 
are increasing leverage for climate requirements.
There’s also a growing body of guidance or voluntary 
pledges that will make climate finance visible and part 
of the investment scheme. For example, Mike mentioned 
Mayor Bloomberg, who was the head of the Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures that was launched 
by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The FSB consists 
of all of the world’s central banks. All of their governors 
decided that it was needed to have a way to provide them 
with recommendations on climate disclosure. There is a 
new technical bulletin on climate risks issued by the Sus-
tainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB).8 And 
then there are some major programs and projects and ini-
tiatives like the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), CDP 
(formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project), and the Climate 
Registry.9 These will all track climate investments, climate 
programs, and climate emissions.
There are many other risks that drive finance to become 
green, including the growing volume of climate litigation 
all over the world. Many of us are aware of some cases in 
6. Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 October 2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure 
of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large Undertakings 
and Groups (L 330/1).
7. 17 C.F.R. §229.19 (1982).
8. SASB, Climate Risk—Technical Bulletin, https://library.sasb.org/cli-
mate-risk-technical-bulletin/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
9. GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 
26, 2018); CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en (last visited Mar. 26, 2018); The 
Climate Registry, https://www.theclimateregistry.org/ (last visited Mar. 
26, 2018).
the United States. But there are also some very high-visi-
bility cases that Sabin Center has tracked in India and the 
Netherlands and other parts of the world that will help 
drive financial investments to look at the risks associated 
with not being climate-friendly.
Technologically, the World Bank has pointed out for 
many years that if there’s deep investment in fossil fuels, 
there’s the risk that these may become stranded assets over 
time. We see it today in the large fluctuating prices that are 
associated with various forms of fossil fuel that are more 
unstable than what one sees today very often in solar and 
wind. And there is the risk that environmental law, envi-
ronmental regulations, are going to increasingly tighten 
carbon dioxide-type emissions. Then, of course, from the 
social standpoint, there is the possibility of boycotts to 
challenge fossil fuel-related investment.
Reputationally as well, the issue of a carbon footprint 
is almost a standard topic for major corporations today. 
Recently, there was the announcement by Walmart that 
they would launch an initiative to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by one gigaton by 2030.10 They enlist their major 
suppliers in the initiative. Therefore, some household names 
around the country will be participating in the tracking of 
greenhouse gases to reduce the amount of emissions and to 
enhance their reputations. Again, these initiatives are not 
legally binding on these entities, but they see it as necessary 
for customer reputational issues.
Shareholders as well are becoming increasingly involved 
in looking at climate impacts. And then from a regulatory 
and policy standpoint, of course, all of those present in 
Paris are aware of the fact that they need to look at how 
they are currently devoting national resources. Is there still 
too much being subsidized on the fossil fuel side as opposed 
to solar and wind? The Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development’s (OECD’s) statistics indicate 
that indeed that is the case still today.11
The Green Climate Fund was first really identified in 
2009 by President Barack Obama and then-Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton. Today, the donors who many of us 
may have been counting on to support green finance are 
also caught up in the humanitarian crises that one sees in 
North Africa and Somalia and Syria, and that makes it all 
the more important to move away from harmful subsidies 
and to use the scarce public resources that we do have to try 
to de-risk renewable energy investment.
That is something that, I think, all of the multilateral 
development banks have been trying to do. It’s interesting 
to see that the new Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
has developed an energy plan that is very much in line with 
the World Bank’s Climate Change Action Plan,12 to really 
10. 
Chain, Walmart (Apr. 19, 2017), https://news.walmart.com/2017/04/19/
walmart-launches-project-gigaton-to-reduce-emissions-in-companys-sup-
ply-chain.
11. OECD, http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
12. World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan (2016), available at 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/677331460056382875/WBG-Climate-
Change-Action-Plan-public-version.pdf.
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use their resources to promote as much as possible renew-
able energy investment in their own targets that they have 
been setting. As well, all of them are advocating proper 
pricing of environmental goods and services, looking at 
including a social cost of carbon, which, of course, the 
Trump executive order removed from the U.S. calculation, 
but that still exists, and I think that is the way most multi-
lateral financial institutions are looking at it.
And then perhaps the latest news of the day dealing 
with this are the very interesting shareholder climate initia-
tives, in which it’s at least reported that Exxon had opposed 
a climate shareholder initiative to report on climate risk 
and climate disclosure that then prevailed by a 62% vote.13 
While it may be nonbinding, it’s interesting to see the large 
actors that have been supporting this kind of initiative, 
such as BlackRock Investment and some of the major U.S. 
pension funds.
Michael Gerrard: Thank you very much, Charles. We’re 
now going to hear from Douglass Sims, who’s an attorney 
with the Natural Resources Defense Council as Director 
of Strategy and Finance in their Center for Market Innova-
tion. He works on a wide range of issues related to renew-
able energy deployment in the United States and abroad.
Douglass Sims: There was a good setup by Charles on 
the importance of leveraging limited public capital to 
drive investment in what we call low-carbon and resil-
ient infrastructure, which includes energy and adaptation 
infrastructure. One concept that I’ve worked on for sev-
eral years is the green investment bank (GIB). We’re going 
to focus on that. The Green Bank Network is a group of 
green banks that have gotten together to help expand best 
practices around the world in green banking and also to 
help new green banks form. We think this institution or 
this function is key to accelerating investments not just in 
India, but everywhere.
So, we’ve heard the setup about the costs of the tran-
sition from fossil fuels to clean energy. But I think the 
important thing is to recognize that this requires a massive 
shift in investment from business-as-usual to new kinds 
of investments in resilience and in low-carbon infrastruc-
ture. This change requires a shift from not just centralized 
energy, but distributed energy both in the United States 
and in developed countries abroad. This is difficult because 
distributed energy is something that is new and it’s small 
and it’s a high transaction cost. So, it becomes a paradigm 
shift both for market mechanisms and also finance. I men-
tioned resilience. It is necessary to build changes in coast-
lines but also water, agriculture, and a whole variety of 
sectors, which aren’t necessarily thought of when we think 
about climate change in the first instance.
13. Marianne Lavelle, 
, Inside Climate News (May 31, 2017), https://insideclimate-
news.org/news/31052017/exxon-shareholder-climate-change-disclosure- 
resolution-approved.
Then, there’s this concept of “greening finance” versus 
green finance. Greening finance we take to mean work-
ing with financial institutions and other investors to apply, 
essentially, climate filters and climate mechanisms and 
analysis to all their investments across the institutions. If 
you look at a food investment, you need to think about the 
supply of water and seeds and how it will be affected by 
climate change. Green finance is a more limited category 
that we term to mean investing in the infrastructure neces-
sary to deal with climate change, energy, energy efficiency, 
and adaptation.
So, the GIBs are a part of the solution. It’s a bit of a 
misnomer. A GIB is not a bank. It doesn’t accept depos-
its like a bank does. It’s not regulated like a bank. But it’s 
a specialized financing vehicle designed to crowd in pri-
vate capital to these sectors.There’s a lot of interest in GIBs 
around the world. There are GIBs in Asia, Europe, and 
the United States. And there’s interesting momentum in 
places like Canada, Chile, India, Mexico, the Philippines, 
and Ukraine.
What is a GIB? Essentially, it’s a publicly capitalized 
financial institution dedicated to increasing private invest-
ment in these sectors. It’s independent from government, 
meaning that even though government sets up the condi-
tions of its equities, it makes investment decisions based 
on independent rigorous determinations of commercial 
viability. Also, it’s got a narrow mandate. It only does green 
investments, which allows it to specialize and get the right 
kinds of people and resources. It’s focused on cost-effec-
tiveness, which means that it has to demonstrate that its 
investments will be, over time, replicable by the market 
and will also result in value to the government. We’ve seen 
a lot of this demonstrated in some of the early GIBs where, 
initially, they were only being subsidized by governments. 
And once the GIBs started entering into the system, there 
were many more dollars invested per public dollar, many 
more megawatts of energy, or negawatts, which is what 
we call energy efficiency leading to energy generation for 
a lesser cost.
Much like the multilateral development banks, trans-
actions in which GIBs engage must be additional. They 
must actually catalyze more investment as a condition to 
investing. Not just maintain the status quo, but help deals 
become cheaper for investors or less risky for investors. 
There’s a focus on accountability, meaning reporting—
both financial, green, and other what we call environmen-
tal, social, and governance (ESG) issues, like jobs created. 
These are designed to crowd in private capital—as opposed 
to crowding out private capital. Crowding out private 
capital occurs when the government takes an activity that 
dominates the field and pushes away private investment; 
conversely, “crowding in” means bringing in more capital.
Very importantly, GIBs are built to serve local policy 
and market needs, be that at the retail or the wholesale 
level. When we say retail, we mean essentially direct loans 
or other interventions with end-users like homeowners 
and businesses. By wholesale, we mean interventions at 
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the financial institution level helping banks make more 
loans or other kinds of investments. And very importantly, 
the capital that comes in to the institutions needs to be 
patient, meaning that it has a long horizon, longer than 
the market would typically generate. Also, it has a different 
kind of return expectation than the market will anticipate 
in most cases.
The one question we often hear is, don’t GIBs duplicate 
other institutions? The answer we give is no. There’s a wide 
variety of institutions doing similar things—some of the 
same things in the market—but they have some different 
characteristics. Multilateral institutions and national devel-
opment banks that are prominent public banks are really 
on the landscape in most places around the world outside 
of developed countries. These have broad mandates—anti-
poverty, electrification, all kinds of things—which are 
developmental indicators that are very important but that 
aren’t necessarily exclusive to green investments.
There are also quite large institutions and they deploy a 
lot of capital, whereas the GIBs are relatively smaller. They 
target things that are trying to crowd in private capital. 
There are also some entities that are just public-sector lend-
ers or financing authorities. Those entities essentially oper-
ate very similarly to their private counterparts that provide 
loans. They don’t necessarily do transformative things that 
share risks with the private sector to crowd them in.
Then there’s the private fund sector, which has the same 
kind of expertise as GIBs. But essentially, that expertise is 
focused on private ends of profit, not on market transfor-
mation. That gives them a role that is not as transformative 
to the broader market. So, GIBs work with these institu-
tions as well as utilities, banks, end-users of energy, equip-
ment providers, contractors, and others to increase the flow 
of capital and information to the market because informa-
tion is what transforms the markets.
I mentioned earlier GIB-like entities, meaning entities 
that do some of the things that GIBs do, but not all of these 
entities operate globally. The ones that we work closely with 
in the Green Bank Network are Connecticut Green Bank, 
New York Green Bank, United Kingdom (U.K.) Green 
Investment Bank, Japan Green Finance Organization, 
Green Tech Malaysia, Clean Energy Finance Corporation 
of Australia, and others that do some similar things. The 
newest GIB is the Montgomery County Green Bank near 
Washington, D.C., in Maryland. There’s some interesting 
work being done in California at the iBank, which does 
some transformative things. But their client base is public-
sector entities.
I’ve been traveling recently, particularly in Asia, work-
ing with folks in the Philippines and India around this 
concept. There’s a lot of interest in it. In emerging markets 
in particular, there’s a niche that banks can fill. I should 
point out that GIBs don’t exist in any emerging markets 
right now other than in Malaysia. A paper14 about this was 
released at the 22nd Conference of the Parties, which is an 
14. Coalition for Green capital et al., Green & Resilience Banks: How 
The Green Investment Bank Model Can Play a Role in Scaling Up 
annual climate event, and last year was in Morocco. There 
are several areas where a GIB can make a difference.
First, earlier, we heard about NDCs. These are high-
level commitments in many cases. But they aren’t actually 
translated into investible projects. So, GIBs can help coun-
tries actually move from concept to investment, working 
with other actors in the market to help make those invest-
ible propositions.
Second, there’s a lot of activity going on and a lot of 
players around how to deploy innovative tools to meet 
these needs. Sometimes these are dispersed around a coun-
try or state, as in the case of the East Coast and New York 
and Connecticut. GIBs can focus that activity in one insti-
tution to help innovation be demonstrated, tested, and 
pushed out to the market in a centralized way. In emerg-
ing markets as well, as was mentioned earlier, there are a 
lot of international climate funds being deployed, and they 
need local partners. Those funds don’t always have access 
to local knowledge. Having a GIB that’s built in under-
standing of local conditions will help them find opportu-
nities and deploy their capital more efficiently. Similarly, 
there can be a conduit function between international and 
national parties, which we call upstream actors. Project-
level downstream actors are contractors, homeowners, and 
building owners that design green banks.
So, what’s the model in short? Different kinds of patient 
capital come in to the GIB and different kinds of products 
and tools get designed by the GIB to deal with specific 
market needs and they get invested in projects. Sources of 
capital include international investors, like the bond mar-
ket, the green bond market, for example; private inves-
tors who want to invest in the space, philanthropy, and 
impact investors; and public sources, meaning interna-
tional donors, bilateral donors, and multilateral donors like 
the Green Climate Fund. And, of course, the fundamental 
capitalization of some GIBs is often done by public sources, 
domestic budgets, or utility surcharges. Coming out of the 
GIB is a bunch of products built on crowding in private 
capital. But there is some straight co-lending, meaning 
lending side-by-side with the private sector without any 
kind of risk mitigation that has its value. Risk mitigation 
and credit enhancement takes some of the risks off of these 
investments to bring in new investors.
Aggregation, warehousing, and securitization—what 
does this mean? That, of course, means taking small proj-
ects that by themselves are nonstandardized with the high 
transaction cost, and putting them together in what’s 
called the warehouse to give them scale. And then intro-
ducing them to the market in various formats. One format 
is called securitization.
Also, there is innovative financing, things that are 
needed to deal with specific problems and specific mar-
kets, whereas we have a market driven by tax credits. That’s 
something that the GIBs can look at with appropriate and 
local conditions and design specific solutions for those con-
Climate Finance in Emerging Markets (2016), available at http://green-
banknetwork.org/portfolio/green-and-resilience-banks/.
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ditions. And then there can be money that is not money 
with returns, attached to grants that are deployed alongside 
investment capital and debt to provide technical assistance 
to contractors and banks to help them understand how 
these markets and transactions work.
So, how are GIBs created? They can be created by law, 
legislation, administrative action, and repurposing and 
consolidating existing entities. In Australia, there was a new 
legislative act passed by parliament. In Connecticut, there 
was also a law passed. But as part of that law, the existing 
entity that was a grantmaking entity was repurposed into 
the Connecticut Green Bank. And in New York, the New 
York Green Bank was formed through an administrative 
action as part of, essentially, the vision of the New York 
State Energy Research and Development Authority, which 
is an existing entity in New York that had the capacity to 
create subsidiaries and divisions within itself.
You can be capitalized in the industrialized countries 
by budget funds, by cap and trade, by utility surcharges. 
And then some forces have come in from emerging mar-
kets, national development banks or funds, international 
sources, and different kinds of investors. So, this will touch 
on the importance of the local specialization and local 
design of these entities. They also have the similar mission 
of crowding in private capital. But they also have particular 
features designed for local climate policy goals.
In Australia, interestingly, there’s an emphasis on trans-
forming into a more competitive economy in the green 
economy, which means that, in practice, Australia doesn’t 
just do commercial investments, but also does venture 
investments, which actually allows them to take some 
additional risks on new technologies that could help the 
country gain an edge in the market. Malaysia is interested 
in spreading green technology around the economy. These 
programs are designed more to push out, to take some 
risk on by the government, to get more investors involved, 
particularly commercial banks in the sector. In Japan, 
interestingly, there’s a very clear mandate to develop com-
munities with some of these projects. That affects the kinds 
of investments they make.
There are also similar types of missions in other GIBs. 
The U.K. Green Investment Bank was the first GIB. 
Recently, it was privatized through its sale to Macquarie, 
which is an Australian bank. That was possible in some 
respects because U.K. GIB’s focus has been to be green and 
profitable. Unlike other green banks, the U.K. GIB always 
strove to be at the same level of pricing and the same level 
of operations as private banks, really preparing it for such a 
privatization. So, the U.K. GIB’s focus wasn’t on providing 
necessarily long-term patient capital, but on providing spe-
cific expertise in areas where other banks hadn’t invested.
Even though markets are different in terms of what they 
need and what the focus is, there are some problems that 
we know about that in every market tend to pose prob-
lems and on which the GIBs focus. One of those is that we 
know how to do big projects, usually with prior purchase 
agreements. But we don’t know how to do projects that are 
medium- and small-sized and are innovative. Typically in 
every market there’s a focus on that. In the U.K., for exam-
ple, offshore wind was a new and very large and expensive 
area where they had to make progress. And they wanted to 
satisfy their climate commitments. So, the U.K. GIB had a 
mandate to do offshore wind.
Small and medium enterprise projects are hard. These 
are projects where the so-called customers, the offtakers, 
are smaller. They don’t have as much resources as larger 
companies. There is a high cost of structuring, and we need 
some special help in those areas too.
Distributed energy, as was already mentioned, is hard 
to finance. Also energy efficiency, which is really hard to 
finance, because basically you’re telling someone that if 
they spend money now, they’ll save money later, and that 
concept is very hard for a lot of actors to appreciate.
Some of the key strategies that GIBs use include credit 
enhancement, where the GIB provides essentially an 
insurance-type product to increase the attractiveness and 
decrease the risk of projects; co-investment needs invest-
ing alongside of investors, lending expertise, reducing 
some requirements for equity to raise more equity if you’re 
making equity investments or debt; and then aggregation 
and warehousing and securitization, which means making 
small projects, adding them up, and then pushing them up 
to the market as a portfolio.
So, how do you measure the success of GIBs? There’s 
this really important concept of leverage. That means, 
how much money do you bring into a particular transac-
tion with the public money that you’re utilizing? In other 
words, leverage ratio. If it’s 2:1, it means you have twice as 
much money coming in from the private sector. If it’s 10:1, 
you have 10 times as much money coming in. This is an 
important metric. But leverage isn’t the only metric.
The metric that GIBs focus on is really something called 
market transformation, which is harder to measure. Mar-
ket transformation occurs not in your transaction, but after 
your transaction. It’s how the market responds without the 
GIB intervention and how fast. It’s hard to measure. This 
is something that is being studied by both GIBs and multi-
lateral developmental banks and others. How do you mea-
sure market transformation? The approach of a GIB should 
be evaluated in what they’re trying to do in the market and 
not just by leverage.
Some of the folks we mentioned earlier in the Green 
Bank Network have been trying to collect their collec-
tive impact in their first, essentially, five years of opera-
tion. Essentially, there’s been about $8 billion invested or 
committed. That brings projects to market in the amount 
of about $26 billion. And there’s a wide variety of invest-
ments in renewables and efficiency and things like batter-
ies, which are very innovative here.
These are starting to come in now and there are chal-
lenges in really making the data apples-to-apples and 
understanding things like leverage, how we should think 
about leverage. This is all part of what the Green Bank 
Network is working on to figure out how to measure our 
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were actually sized based on the amount of energy savings 
that the projects would yield, which is also very innova-
tive and has now been taken up by other actors in the 
market in that market transformation measure that we 
talked about earlier.
There are several ways to create a GIB. There are four 
steps. First is figuring out what the market needs by scop-
ing out what the barriers are to initial investment and by 
meeting stakeholders. Second is analyzing and investigat-
ing in more depth. Third is figuring out the legal structure 
and putting it in place. Then, fourth, is operations. The 
Green Bank Network is looking to expand, and we’re hop-
ing that we can get some emerging markets and some of 
the new GIBs in the United States to join us this year. We 
think we’re going to be transformative both in the United 
States and abroad in helping catalyze private investment.
Michael Gerrard: Now we’re going to hear from John Rou-
sakis, who’s an environmental attorney with O’Melveny & 
Myers. He represents private equity in financial, commer-
cial, and industrial clients in transactions, litigation, and 
regulatory compliance matters.
John Rousakis: Thank you, Michael. I’m going to expand 
on a concept that both Charles and Doug mentioned, and 
that’s greening finance. So, I’m not going to talk about 
green finance. But there has been a lot of activity in the 
field of greening finance over the past 10 years. I’ll focus 
particularly on the private equity space.
When we talk about this, we’re talking about how insti-
tutional investors and others have attempted to ensure that 
the companies they invest in are managed responsibly and 
sustainably with an eye toward reducing carbon footprints, 
with an eye toward reducing other environmental impacts 
and minimizing environmental risks, and with sensitiv-
ity toward community concerns and needs. I want to talk 
about where we came from, where we are now, and where 
we’re going.
To give some context, this was driven by activity in the 
EU over 10 years ago. It was a really active time in the EU in 
terms of environmental legislation and other activity. The 
Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, and the EU was very 
active in implementing the Protocol in the 2000s through 
the Emissions Trading System. In the mid-2000s, they 
passed the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and 
Restriction of Chemicals Regulation (REACH), the Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive (WEEE), 
and the Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive 
(RoHS),15 which focused on product stewardship.
These rules sought to reduce carbon emissions and green 
the supply chain. In the private sector, companies like 
Walmart, General Electric, Hewlett Packard, and Apple 
were also looking to green their supply chains, and were 
15. REACH, Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 18 December 2006 Concerning the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals; WEEE, Direc-
tive 2002/96/EC, amended as Directive 2012/19/EU; RoHS, Directive 
2002/95/EC, amended as Directive 2011/65/EU.
actual progress in bringing in private capital in ways that 
are transforming the market.
There are examples of civic transactions that have been 
done by some of these GIBs. If you look at Malaysia, 
which, again, is an emerging economy, the banks there 
want to get involved in this space but have difficulty doing 
so. Therefore, Malaysia has deployed a specific sort of sub-
sidy program that really isn’t typical for most GIBs. It is a 
straight-up subsidy. But the goal is to increase financing 
at a lower financing cost to really get the market going. 
So, their scheme is to provide a government guarantee 
that is a kind of classic bilateral-type device or sovereign 
device, 50% of financing provided by financial institutions 
in Malaysia, local banks, plus a rebate on interest of 2%. 
There’s going to be a savings to the end-user as well. As a 
result, as of last year, they’ve funded 248 projects, primar-
ily renewables—80% of those have been renewable energy, 
solar, and biomass—and also in water. They brought a lot 
of new investors into the space. Twenty-seven banks and 
other institutions that would not have invested, invested 
because of the program.
In Japan, there’s a real need to facilitate loan financ-
ing for developers by decreasing debt-to-equity ratio. That 
means that if a project costs $100 and 80% of that needs 
to be provided by debt and 20% by equity, the 20% that 
the local developer has to provide is provided instead by 
the GIB. By doing that, the GIB actually brings more debt 
into the market. It also allows it to share managerial skills 
with the management of the small developer to help them 
do projects more efficiently going forward.
The U.K., as mentioned, looked at the offshore wind 
sector. Essentially, the U.K. had a couple different goals. 
They wanted to bring new investors into the sector and they 
wanted to allow the existing investors that were mainly in 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia to be able to 
exit their investments because there wasn’t a lot of liquid-
ity in the market to get out of these investments. So, they 
invested first in operating wind projects. Then, they went 
upstream to invest in wind projects. Then, they created the 
first offshore wind fund. That fund allowed them to attract 
pension funds that otherwise wouldn’t have invested in 
this area. Again, that line of investments created a valuable 
asset that the U.K. has now monetized in privatization.
In Australia, the green bond market really tries to get 
bond investors with the biggest pool of capital in the world 
into the green space by offering them investments that are 
verified green investments. To get that market started in 
Australia, the Australian Cooperative Finance Corpora-
tion has done some really interesting investments in what 
is called “cornerstone investments” to really catalyze these 
markets. A particular one was in solar and storage proj-
ects that have never been done before, so it was deemed as 
being risky.
There is some really interesting work in Connecticut 
around solar. Activating solar in Connecticut where the 
GIB in the state offered direct loans to customers that 
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powerful in the sense that “we have these suppliers and 
we can influence them or we can do a lot of environmen-
tal good by basically imposing certain environmental and 
social standards on their activities.”
So, institutional investors thought about that, too. In 
2003, banks got together and drafted the Equator Princi-
ples that influenced project finance.16 In 2006, the United 
Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) 
were drafted. At the time, a handful of institution investors 
signed on to the UN PRI. To give some perspective, now 
there are 1,700 investors that are signed on to the UN PRI. 
That represents $60 trillion in assets under management 
that are under a framework or umbrella of responsible 
investing. That’s huge and really transformative.
So what are these principles? I’ll name the first three 
because they provide a good framework for what we’re 
going to discuss. The first one is that we will incorporate 
ESG issues into investment analysis and decisionmaking 
processes. That is diligence. That’s something we’ve done 
and it’s been enhanced in the past few years. The second 
one is we will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues 
into our ownership policies and practices. That is imple-
mentation. What do we do when we buy a company and 
how do we implement these ESG goals? The third is we 
will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the enti-
ties in which we invest. That’s reporting. What do we tell 
the world about what we’re doing? There’s a lot of discus-
sion about whether or not public companies are doing 
that appropriately and sufficiently. Although, in the pri-
vate equity space they’re not required to report publicly, 
there’s some discussion about how much they should be 
required to report publicly as opposed to just to their lim-
ited partners.
A private equity general partner sets up the fund and 
raises money for that fund. And then, limited partners, 
institutional investors, pension funds, sovereign wealth 
funds, and other investors put their money in the fund for 
10 to 14 years or so. In that period, the private equity firm 
invests, buys companies, holds them for a while and man-
ages them, and sells them.
Right now, in terms of the assets under management for 
private equity, we’re talking about several trillion dollars 
of assets. So a significant portion of those assets are now 
under this ESG umbrella.
Initially, when the UN PRI first came into effect, the 
process was more one of self-assessment. Limited partners 
essentially asked their general partners to report on what 
they were doing in terms of evaluating ESG risks and what 
they were doing to improve performance in that regard. 
It was more of a self-assessment framework. It was looser. 
Over time, it’s become more rigorous and comprehen-
sive. Now, we have an effort to really dig more deeply into 
how the performance of companies can be improved from 
an environmental perspective and analyze what kinds of 
opportunities exist for cost savings and for actually capi-
16. Equator Principles, http://equator-principles.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 
2018).
talizing on, for example, opportunities in climate change 
adaptation and carbon reduction.
Another thing that was driving this in the 2000s was 
that we had the financial crisis. There were a lot of compa-
nies looking to save money, so they got pretty serious about 
energy savings. There were opportunities to cut costs, and 
there were grants being provided by state and federal gov-
ernments for energy savings. So a lot of corporate America 
saw this as a way to improve their bottom line and also 
potentially get some public funding for it.
In 2009, the Private Equity Growth Capital Council—
now called the American Investment Council—drew up 
their own guidelines for responsible investments that reflect 
most of what were in the UN PRI. They committed to 
incorporate these types of principles into their investments 
as well. Examples of the types of issues and questions that 
are incorporated into the frameworks include, for example, 
diligence. Due diligence process and scope-type questions. 
Whether or not portfolio companies have ESG policies. 
How do you implement these policies? What actions have 
companies taken to incorporate ESG into operations? And 
what impacts have those ESG programs had on the com-
panies’ financials and their communities?
In terms of diligence, as you can imagine, we’ve always 
done diligence on companies and we’ve done deep environ-
mental diligence. We do this to understand what risks are 
associated with investments. Now, we’re sort of evolving to 
look more toward carbon and climate change-related risks 
in diligence. We have banks asking us questions about cli-
mate change risks associated with a business, such as flood 
risks. These are things we’re asking companies. We’re ask-
ing companies what kind of sustainability programs they 
have and whether or not they have evaluated their climate 
change-related risks. It’s getting challenging, but we’re 
starting to develop deeper evaluative diligence tools to fig-
ure this out.
For example, some of the challenges relate to evaluating 
whether or not a company has a deep supply chain risk, 
how water-dependent the company is, and whether or not 
their suppliers will be able to supply them in the event of a 
climate catastrophe or flood or storm or other major event. 
So, that’s an evolving area. It’s particularly challenging as 
diligence often is abbreviated in transactions.
There’s been a significant evolution over the past 10 years 
in terms of implementation. Ten years ago, firms had not 
necessarily staffed up to help portfolio companies imple-
ment the types of ESG programs that are now expected, 
and there’s a wide range of sophistication in terms of imple-
menting these types of programs. So, you have your large 
private equity firms that have staffed up considerably and 
have good-sized staffs and programs and actually go into 
their portfolio companies and help them identify environ-
mental risks and find environmental opportunities.
For example, we’ve seen a large private equity firm bring 
together all their portfolio companies in one place to share 
best practices and to raise the level of sophistication of 
the smaller companies. Eighty-one percent of S&P 500 
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companies now report on sustainability. There’s variation 
in how informative the information they provide is, but 
it’s generally accepted now that a big company will think 
about this stuff and tell the world what it’s doing to reduce 
its carbon footprint, to improve its environmental perfor-
mance, and be sensitive to social needs.
When you get down to the smaller and mid-cap compa-
nies, it’s not something they’re necessarily thinking about. 
So, I think what’s happened in the private equity space is 
that you have information-sharing and you have the bigger 
companies influence the level of performance of the smaller 
and mid-cap companies just through an information-shar-
ing process and by subjecting them to the rigors of an ESG 
framework that has been imposed by the limited partners 
and through the PRI-type framework.
We also see environmental consultants being used to 
evaluate the environmental and social performance at com-
panies. Limited partners will see that and recognize that as 
a sign that there’s a fairly high level of interest and concern 
at a company. That’s a good sign to them.
Moving on to the next topic: reporting and disclosure. 
Under the private equity framework, the general partners 
are required to report on their ESG performance to their 
limited partners generally on an annual basis. There’s been 
a bit of pressure for private equity to report in the way 
that public companies report. It’s not necessarily going to 
happen, although some private equity firms do some pub-
lic reporting. I believe KKR does. But for the most part, 
mid-sized and smaller private equity firms especially don’t 
do a lot of reporting. But the substance of ESG report-
ing is interesting because we’re seeing a movement to be 
more specific in terms of reporting, whether it’s privately 
or publicly.
The SASB, which Charles mentioned, is developing spe-
cific metrics for reporting. The SASB has now developed 
79 industry standards for reporting. What they’ve done, 
because this stuff has been so vague in a lot of ways, is 
they’ve developed standards for various industries but they 
kept it pretty tight. For each industry, they’ve developed 
about five disclosure topics and 13 metrics. Not hundreds. 
Not dozens. So, when you’re looking at an industry, they’ve 
sort of focused in on what might be material to evaluating 
a company. They are now pushing that as a standard for 
public disclosure of environmental and social risks.
So, the big picture is that there’s been a major cultural 
transformation over the past 10 years in terms of how seri-
ously companies take sustainability, and how deeply they 
go into their operations to figure out risks and opportu-
nities on the environmental and social side. When you 
think about this, especially in the financial world and in 
the private equity world, these aren’t necessarily people 
you would have thought 20 years ago would have sensitiv-
ity toward these issues. There has absolutely been a much 
higher level of sensitivity, particularly at the large private 
equity firms. It’s become part of their DNA. It has been 
pushed onto companies based initially on pressure from 
limited partners, and now it’s become sort of embedded in 
the culture.
Michael Gerrard: We now have time for questions. First, 
is a question from the audience. How is the green bond 
market in the U.S.?
Charles Di Leva: All I could say to that is at least the 
World Bank is very successful in selling green bonds, 
including into the U.S. market. Last year, I think, was the 
largest volume that they’ve ever sold, I think about $9 bil-
lion. So, for those following the green bond market, I think 
it’s interesting to look at the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA) because they’ve set out principles for 
green bonds. When you go to their site, you can actually 
look at third-party auditor reviews of the different green 
bond projects that have been financed.
So, to the extent that groups like ICMA and the World 
Bank are publishing data on the different projects, we’ll 
start to see a more transparent and a more robust market 
for green bonds. I think that, at least in my experience 
within the World Bank Group, for both the private-sector 
side and the public-sector side, there’s a lot of optimism 
and a lot of support for moving ahead on green bonds.
Michael Gerrard: The next question for the panelists is: 
do you have recommendations or websites for individuals 
who want to invest in green banking?
Douglass Sims: There’s the Green Bank Network at 
greenbanknetwork.org. It’s the organization that has the 
most information about GIBs. They’re currently given an 
opportunity to invest in the GIBs themselves generally 
because they are publicly owned institutions. There are of 
course transactions where the GIBs co-invest with private 
investors, so you can maybe invest in transactions that 
they’re involved in. I think the New York Green Bank in 
particular has an open request for proposal process that 
is interesting to explore, about the opportunity to invest 
with New York Green Bank. Their website is greenbank.
ny.gov. But greenbanknetwork.org is the place to start for 
GIB information.
Michael Gerrard: We have a question about the privatiza-
tion of the U.K. GIB. Why did that happen and is that 
applicable in other places?
Douglass Sims: I should emphasize that it was not with-
out extreme controversy and it wasn’t, as far as I’m aware, 
the initial plan with the institution. It was a decision that 
was made by the government to do so at a certain time, 
but I think what enabled it was the fact that the return 
targets that it had were essentially market returns. So, 
now with the thing done, mostly it demonstrates that the 
investments that it was making could be replicated by the 
private markets without a lot of alteration. That was sort of 
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the strategy and the goal, to be as near as possible to the 
market, and that made it attractive to them.
You can imagine an institution that targeted different 
kinds of goals. If it had a lower return portfolio, it wouldn’t 
be attractive. Is it a pathway for other green banks? I think 
to some extent. It depends. I think some of them are not 
set up to be privatized. I think many of them aren’t selling 
portfolios, which is essentially just debt trading. It’s on the 
portfolio of projects that Connecticut has done. So, insti-
tutionally I don’t know if we’ll see more of that, if it’s good 
or bad. But I think that we are certainly seeing portfolio 
sales of GIB assets to private actors, and co-investments 
and other kinds of innovative public-private partnerships 
as it were.
Michael Gerrard: Let me ask a question. To what extent 
in the United States is the difficulty in getting financing 
a constraint on the construction of new renewable energy 
facilities? Is it the case that any renewable energy facility 
that has a viable economic model and likely has purchasers 
for its power is likely to be able to find the money for it, 
or is lack of financing a constraint? Any thoughts on that?
Charles Di Leva: I’ll comment on how the U.K. was able 
to move forward with privatization. I think that the pri-
vate market gets the incentive through the legal or regula-
tory change. So, the U.K. has some pretty strong climate 
change legislation. Of course, they’re part of the EU’s com-
mitment through Paris. So, you can privatize when you’re 
pretty clear that the market is getting the signals from the 
policy side.
In the United States now, in the current situation, we’ll 
probably get a fragmented approach where you have some 
smaller banks in California and New York and other states 
looking to move forward. Just in D.C. recently is an inter-
esting proposal to price carbon. So, if we have these kinds 
of measures, it’s probably going to help the private sector 
see that there’s the incentive to start using their capital 
because they’ll know about the greater sense of return.
Douglass Sims: Also in D.C., as you mentioned, there’s 
a thought to do a city-based GIB. But on the question of 
can you close financing gaps, I think there’s no one answer 
to that question. I will say that we’re seeing, not just in the 
United States, that the cost of renewable energy has really 
reached grid parity in some places—certainly in the wind 
sector there are some federal signals on the production tax 
credit, and things like that.
But there’s an increasing number of cases where good 
parity has been reached and people are looking at what 
we call merchant risks. I mean most projects need what’s 
called a power purchase agreement, a long-term purchase 
agreement to support financing. But in some places, 
increasingly, there’s people willing to just take market 
prices on power and take a bet on the trend of the market. 
So, we’ll see more of that as prices come down, assuming 
that demand for energy holds up.
Charles Di Leva: I think one of the concerns is maybe the 
price will come down too much, but that’s another story. 
That would probably be a happy story.
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